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This article examines the rise of leftist ideology in Ecuador and Bolivia in light 
of their deepening economic relations with China from 2005 to 2014. First, it 
reveals that market trends account for trade fluctuations but fail to explain 
Chinese investment in, and some loan deals with, Ecuador as well as loans to 
Bolivia. Second, it demonstrates how these forms of funding provided alterna-
tives to U.S.-led international institutions, enabling Rafael Correa and Evo 
Morales to steer away from Western influence. Third, it contends that four fac-
tors led to a cyclic reinforcement of Chinese economic interests and the rise of left-
ist ideology in Ecuador and Bolivia, namely: mutual complementarity between 
China’s demand for energy/natural resource supply diversification and Pink 
Tide development agendas; U.S.–China geopolitical competition for influence 
in Latin America; China’s experience in engaging with leftist governments from 
developing countries; and anti-Americanism shaping national identity in Ec-
uador and Bolivia.
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China empujó la marea rosa y la marea rosa tiró a china
Intereses económicos e ideología entretelados en  
ecuador y bolivia (2005-2014)
Este artículo examina el surgimiento de la ideología de izquierda en Ecuador 
y Bolivia a la luz de sus relaciones económicas cada vez más profundas con 
China de 2005 a 2014. Primero, revela que las tendencias del mercado explican 
las fluctuaciones comerciales pero no explican la inversión china en, y algunos 
acuerdos de préstamos con, Ecuador, así como préstamos a Bolivia. En segundo 
lugar, demuestra cómo estas formas de financiación proporcionaron alternativas 
a las instituciones internacionales lideradas por Estados Unidos, lo que permitió 
a Rafael Correa y Evo Morales alejarse de la influencia occidental. En tercer 
lugar, sostiene que cuatro factores llevaron a un refuerzo cíclico de los intereses 
económicos chinos y al surgimiento de la ideología de izquierda en Ecuador y Bo-
livia, a saber: complementariedad mutua entre la demanda de China de diversi-
ficación del suministro de energía/recursos naturales y las agendas de desarrollo 
de la Marea Rosa; Competencia geopolítica entre Estados Unidos y China por 
la influencia en América Latina; La experiencia de China en la interacción 
con gobiernos de izquierda de países en desarrollo; y el antiamericanismo que 
configura la identidad nacional en Ecuador y Bolivia.
Palabras clave: China, América Latina, Intereses económicos, Marea 
rosa, Ecuador, Bolivia, Ideología de izquierda en América Latina, Com-
ercio, Inversión, Préstamos, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa.
中國推粉紅之潮和被推翻的粉紅之潮：
厄瓜多爾和玻利維亞的經濟利益和意識形態交織在一起 (2005-2014)
鑑於厄瓜多爾和玻利維亞從2005年到2014年與中國的經濟關係不斷加
深, 本文考察了左翼意識形態的興起。首先, 它揭示了市場趨勢是貿易波
動的原因, 但不能解釋中國的投資, 有些貸款涉及, 厄瓜多爾以及對玻利
維亞的貸款。其次, 它展示了這些形式的資金如何為美國主導的國際機
構提供替代方案, 從而使拉斐爾·科雷亞（Rafael Correa）和埃沃·莫拉萊
斯（Evo Morales）擺脫西方的影響。第三, 它認為有四個因素導致中國經
濟利益的周期性增強和厄瓜多爾和玻利維亞的左翼意識形態的興起, 即: 
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中國對能源/自然資源供應多樣化的需求與粉紅潮發展議程之間的相互
補充; 中美地緣政治競爭對拉丁美洲的影響;中國與發展中國家左翼政府
互動的經驗; 和反美主義塑造了厄瓜多爾和玻利維亞的民族認同。
關鍵字: 中國, 拉丁美洲, 經濟利益, 粉紅潮, 厄瓜多爾, 玻利維亞, 拉丁美
洲的左派意識形態, 貿易, 投資, 貸款, 埃沃·莫拉萊斯, 拉斐爾·科雷亞。
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, China’s 
economic relations with Latin America went through three periods. The 
first (1949–1978) was shaped by Mao Zedong’s ideologically driven for-
eign policy, disregarding economic considerations. China self-identified 
as a third-world country guided by socialist ideology. This shaped its 
pursuit of a largely independent foreign policy, seeking proximity to 
states with similar self-ascribed identities, even when that came at a hefty 
economic price resulting from limited international exposure. Through-
out this period, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was 
consistently lower than that of traditionally poor countries like Chad 
and Malawi (Ang 2016, 5). Yet China provided developmental assistance 
to a number of then-developing countries sharing its ideology, such as 
Chile whose socialist government was the first one in Latin America to 
recognize China in 1970 (Chen and Chen 2013, 56). This discourse of 
solidarity with the “third world” masked China’s still-unfulfilled ambi-
tion to assume leadership of the Global South.
The second period of economic relations between China and Latin 
America (1978 to the late 1990s) was marked by stagnation. This was 
driven by three factors: first, China’s focus on boosting its own eco-
nomic development took the state’s attention away from international 
politics; second, increasing U.S. influence on Latin America’s economic 
development surrounded the end of the Cold War; and third, the long 
distance between China and Latin America discouraged their engage-
ment. Deng Xiaoping put China on a path of “hiding its capabilities 
and biding its time,” focusing first on the country’s domestic economic 
development. This reordering of political priorities, combined with 
long physical distance and globally rising U.S. geopolitical influence, 
resulted in declining engagement between China and Latin America. 
Many Latin American states were either attracted by the economic ide-
ology of the United States or encouraged to adopt neoliberal economic 
policies through conditionalities paired with International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) loans. The outcome of these reforms differed starkly from 
Chile’s rising middle class to Argentina’s repeated crises (Undurraga 
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2015)—hence, evaluations of Latin America’s economic development 
during these decades are mixed (Huber and Solt 2004).
Combined with China’s simultaneous rise, the decline of neoliber-
alism created a favorable geoeconomic environment for an increase 
in its trade with Latin America. This context shaped the third period 
of relations between the two, a gradual rapprochement which started 
in 2001 and continues to date. In late 1999, China launched its “going 
out” policy, committing to trade openness, followed by its World Trade 
Organization (WTO) entry in 2001. Since then, China’s economic 
engagement with Latin America grew substantially. Between 2000 
and 2014, the trade of goods increased from US$10 billion to over 
US$250 billion (see Figure 1). This number has slowly continued to 
rise, reaching US$307 billion in 2018 (Ray and Wang 2019) and then 
stagnating.
Meanwhile, domestic politics in Latin America changed; growing 
discontent with neoliberalism led to a number of protests during the 
noughties (Mollona 2016). This spurred the rise to power of many left-
ist leaders, resulting in the Pink Tide which includes the rise of Lula de 
Silva (Brazil in 2003) and Michelle Bachelet (Chile in 2007), as well as 
revolutionary-minded leftists like Evo Morales (Bolivia in 2006), Rafael 
Correa (Ecuador in 2007), and Hugo Chávez/Nicolás Maduro (Venezu-
ela in 1999 and 2013). The Pink Tide was a short-term phenomenon in 
some countries, but this was not the case for the latter three.
Figure 1.
China–Latin America Trade (Yearly / US$ million).
 Total Trade Volume
 Chinese Exports to Latin America
 Latin American Exports to China
 Trade Imbalance
Source. Data from Bárcena and others (2015); graph created by author.
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Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela are often grouped in political analy-
ses of Latin America as former strongholds of a radical left. However, the 
situation in Venezuela differs vastly from that in Ecuador and Bolivia. 
Venezuela has a longer history of leftist governance and an economy 
entirely dependent on oil exports. Chavez also greatly centralized power 
before his death, allowing leftist ideology to remain influential under 
Maduro (Ellis 2017) as Chavismo’s influence is perpetuated by systemic 
factors that override public opinion. It is clear that there is no longer 
continuous popular support for this regime which has moved toward 
exploitative totalitarianism in a resource-rich country, and the recent 
deepening of Venezuela’s economic crisis has drawn global attention to, 
and criticism of, its politics (Fuentes, Rogers, and di Natale 2018).
This is not the case for Ecuador and Bolivia which also share a 
number of similarities. First, only one year separated the first election 
victories of Morales and Correa. Second, both countries are located in 
the Andes and have a similar population size: 16.3 million people in 
Ecuador and 11.2 million in Bolivia. Third, natural resources account 
for a substantial amount of both countries’ GDP, but neither is solely 
reliant on them (Banco Central de Bolivia 2020a; Banco Central del 
Ecuador 2020b). After the election of Correa (subsequently Moreno) 
and Morales (recently succeeded by Interim President Jeanine Áñez), 
Ecuador and Bolivia began to develop comprehensive economic rela-
tions with China, which form the focus of this article.
I explore the period 2005–2014 for two reasons. First, 2005 marks 
Morales’ first election win and Correa’s first political campaign. Second, 
there exist much more reliable data about large-scale projects and/or 
deals from Correa and Morales’ first two terms compared to their final 
ones (2013–2017 and 2014–2019, respectively). This concern is based on 
observed incoherencies in data sets reported by various institutions—
given the polarizing political climate which accompanied the final years 
of the Correa and Morales administrations, it could be the result of 
deliberately misrepresented data.
Economic relations have four aspects: trade, investment, loans, and 
aid. This article explores trade as the sum of Ecuador and Bolivia’s 
exported and imported goods to and from China. I then focus on Chi-
nese private and state-led foreign direct investment into Ecuador and 
Bolivia. The inverse relationship is neglected due to the asymmetry 
between economy sizes. The next aspect is loans; I only consider Chi-
nese loans to Ecuador and Bolivia equivalent to, or larger than, US$100 
million; smaller loans are disregarded due to their relative economic 
and political insignificance. The final aspect of economic relations is 
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aid which also remains outside of this article’s scope due to its relative 
irrelevance. China has expressed a willingness to provide aid to Latin 
America; for instance, in 2006 Chinese media reported plans to offer 
US$2 million to Ecuador after an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8 
struck Manta (CGTN 2016). However, no major follow-up reports sur-
faced to verify this. As neither Ecuador nor Bolivia requires consistent 
economic aid, China evaluates its potential needs on a case-by-case basis, 
and there are no meaningful trends in that regard. The focus of this 
article thus falls on three elements of its economic relations with Ecua-
dor and Bolivia: trade, investment, and loans.
China’s deepening economic relationship with Ecuador and Bolivia 
corresponds to two trends. The first is China’s increasing overall engage-
ment with Latin America which began after its 2001 entry into the WTO; 
the second is Ecuador and Bolivia’s shift toward leftist leadership—as 
economic cooperation with China only accelerated after Morales and 
Correa won their first election bids in 2005 and 2006, respectively. This 
leads one to wonder about the extent to which China’s increasing eco-
nomic engagement with Ecuador and Bolivia was shaped by political, as 
opposed to market, forces.
This article addresses three research questions. What are the major 
trends, spikes, and falls in China–Ecuador and China–Bolivia economic 
relations between 2005 and 2014? To what extent can they be explained 
by market macro-trends and what political factors influenced them? Do 
political and economic realities intertwine in the process of deepening 
engagement between China, Ecuador, and Bolivia—all of which shared 
some (leftist and anti-American) ideological similarities as a common 
political denominator during 2005/2006–2014? The first two questions 
are discussed in the first two parts of the article which analyze China’s 
economic relations with Ecuador and Bolivia; the third is addressed 
in a separate, extended section. The results reveal that while China’s 
trade with Ecuador and Bolivia is largely market-driven, investment 
and loan trends are influenced by their cyclic intertwining with shifts 
in Ecuadorian and Bolivian politics. I thus argue that China’s economic 
engagement with Ecuador and Bolivia deepened disproportionately 
from 2005 to 2014 due to the simultaneous rise of leftist governments 
in these states at the time—which took place in a geopolitical environ-
ment conducive to China’s rise. I contend that four factors led to a 
cyclic reinforcement of Chinese economic interests and leftist ideology 
in Ecuador and Bolivia, namely: (1) mutual complementarity between 
China’s demand for energy and natural resource supply diversification 
alongside spending-heavy, extractive development agendas shaped by 
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the Pink Tide; (2) U.S.–China geopolitical competition for influence in 
Latin America; (3) China’s past experience in engaging with leftist gov-
ernments from developing countries; and (4) anti-American ideology 
shaping national identity in Ecuador and Bolivia.
China–Ecuador Economic Relations
Here, I explore trade, investment, and loan patterns between China 
and Ecuador from 2005 to 2014 and evaluate whether they are driven 
by political or market forces. I show that trade patterns were motivated 
by market forces and contend that Chinese foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Ecuador intensified each time Correa consolidated his power. 
I also explain how China’s positioning as a non-Western lender drove 
Ecuador’s increasing reliance on its loans.
Trade
Ecuador’s primary exports are raw materials; they consistently take 
up over 70 percent of the country’s total exports, including over 50 per-
cent crude oil, around 10 percent bananas, between 5 and 10 percent 
shrimp, and 3–3.5 percent natural flowers. Ecuador’s trade composition 
with China is similar, consisting primarily of oil and raw material exports 
(consistently over 80%) as well as bananas; this does not deviate substan-
tially from broader market trends.
Ecuador’s imports from China have traditionally been more diverse 
and larger in volume, including between 10 and 20 percent for elec-
tronic equipment, machinery, and vehicles each, while other categories 
are dispersed and tend to take up less than 10 percent each. Similar to 
the majority of other Latin American states, Ecuador’s imports from 
China grew exponentially after 2001, leading to an increasingly deep-
ening trade imbalance in favor of China. Figure 2 reveals two trends: 
a 2008 spike and a post-2010 steady increase. Comparing this to the 
broader China–Latin America trade pattern (cf. Figures 1 and 2) shows 
that the two are almost identical. This strongly suggests that China–
Ecuador trade is market-driven, and exploring its links to Ecuadorean 
politics is unlikely to yield insightful conclusions; the next subsection 
moves to investment.
Investment
The pattern of Chinese investment into Ecuador (Figure 5) dif-
fers from broader market trends, including Chinese outward foreign 
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direct investment (OFDI) globally (Figure 3) and Chinese FDI into 
Latin America (Figure 4). Obtaining accurate numbers for Chinese 
capital outflow is challenging as much of it is processed through Hong 
Kong or offshore companies (Li and Zhang 2017); however, data from 
China’s Ministry of Commerce (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Com-
merce of the People’s Republic of China [MOFCOM]) reveal a broadly 
valid trend which moves only upward for 2003–2014. This is unable to 
account for fluctuations in China–Latin America investment or in Chi-
nese investment in Ecuador. As there is no official data on China’s FDI 
in Latin America, compiled estimates from various reports were used to 
create Figure 4, providing a starting point for understanding whether 
Chinese FDI in Ecuador appears to be market-driven. Figures 4 and 5 
exhibit significant divergences, so the remainder of this section pro-
ceeds to seek explanations for that.
Although China began pursuing increasingly active engagement with 
Latin America and Ecuador in 2001, this had little effect until 2006–
2007 when sharp investment spikes were observed in both (see Figures 
4 and 5). The initial 2006 spike relates to broader trends and could be 
attributed to market forces, but this does not hold for its subsequent 
increase and sustenance.
Correa’s first election win came in 2006, and variation in his popular-
ity mirrors subsequent China–Ecuador investment fluctuations. Figure 5 
illustrates three major trends of Chinese FDI into Ecuador after 2006: a 
spike in 2007, a spike in 2011, and post-2011 stabilization. All three are 
related to Correa’s election wins and his consolidation of power which 
was reinforced by keeping campaign promises. Correa ran on a leftist 
platform, pledging increased funding for health care, education, social 
Figure 2.
China–Ecuador Trade (Yearly / US$ Million).
-5000
0
5000
10000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Chinese Exports to Ecuador (FOB) Ecuadorian Exports to China
Trade Imbalance Total
Source. Data from Banco Central del Ecuador (2020b); figure created by author.
Note. FOB = free on board.
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security, and housing while limiting external debt and decreasing taxes 
(El Universo 2006). His agenda was almost entirely focused on spending, 
except in two areas: developing new oil extraction projects and construct-
ing new refineries, both of which matched China’s economic interests.
Figure 5.
Chinese FDI in Ecuador (Yearly / US$ Million).
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Source. Data from Banco Central del Ecuador (2020c); graph created by author.
Note. FDI = foreign direct investment.
Figure 3.
Chinese OFDI Worldwide (Yearly / US$ Billion).
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Source. Data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(2020); graph created by author.
Note. OFDI = outward foreign direct investment.
Figure 4.
Chinese FDI in Latin America (Yearly / US$ Billion).
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Source. Data from Avedano and others (2017); graph created by author.
Note. FDI = foreign direct investment.
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Much of China’s oil is imported, and its demand for energy is 
projected to exponentially exceed its capacity for increasing domestic 
supply—this estimate is based on calculations that already include a 
projected stark yearly increase in China’s domestic supply capacity 
(Wei 2016, 6). China constantly seeks to diversify its supply sources, 
and the 2007 spike in investment into Ecuador is a natural match 
between the projected increase in its energy needs and Correa’s plan 
to intensify oil extraction. This allowed him to temporarily boost 
Ecuador’s economic development while fulfilling his spending-heavy 
political agenda.
After 2007, Chinese investment in Ecuador became largely concen-
trated in energy, and engagement in all other sectors remained negli-
gible in comparison. For instance, in 2014 alone China invested US$74.5 
million in developing Ecuadorian mines and quarries, while the largest 
amount it ever invested in a non-energy sector was US$4 million (over 
18 times less) in manufacturing during the same year (Banco Central 
del Ecuador 2020d). The ratio of Chinese investment in energy has been 
consistently larger than that in all other sectors, and they thus remain 
outside of this article’s scope.
In mid-2009, Rafael Correa was reelected, but this did not imme-
diately attract an increase in Chinese FDI as Ecuadorean politics 
went through a period of instability. After his reelection, Correa 
ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the U.S. Military Air Base 
in Manta—as he had promised in his campaign. Pro-U.S. voters and 
lobbyists interpreted this as an act of anti-Americanism, leading to 
discontent among some Ecuadorians. In the following year, Correa 
faced large anti-government protests against a domestic law which 
decreased benefits for military and law enforcement officers. The 
protest escalated into the later widely discussed 30-S coup attempt 
which ultimately failed. Ecuador’s government subsequently ran 
into a number of diplomatic skirmishes with the United States over 
having granted a travel card to Edward Snowden, while Ecuadorean 
officials blamed the United States for using trade negotiations to 
exert diplomatic pressure on them. In light of this escalating tension 
and political crisis for Correa, he aimed to reenergize his base by 
promoting a populist narrative that Ecuador will decouple its ideol-
ogy and foreign policy from the United States, and his actions after 
2010–2011 indeed reflected his intention. This served as a turning 
point, spurring a lasting opening toward Chinese foreign investment 
which started in 2011 and continued through 2014.
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Loans
Ecuador’s 2014 debt to China is reported to have been between 
US$6.6 billion (Banco Central del Ecuador 2020a) and US$13.8 billion 
(compiled media and other reports: Araujo 2016; The Dialogue 2018). 
This makes up around 10 percent (low-end estimates) to 20 percent 
(high-end estimates) of the country’s total external debt. Discrepancies 
stem from a lack of clarity on the number of reported deals which in 
fact materialized and the criteria used by the Central Bank of Ecuador 
to define loans as opposed to investment or transaction deals.
From Ecuador’s perspective, Chinese loans became available in 2009 
after the first one was given out following President Correa’s reelec-
tion. After 2010, the total volume of Chinese loans to Ecuador began 
to increase significantly. From the perspective of political economy, the 
initial impulse for this increase in 2009–2010 was motivated by a number 
of factors. First, the global financial crisis (GFC) stifled Western lenders 
(Liu 2012) which prompted Ecuador’s government to seek alternatives. 
Second, global markets saw a sharp oil price drop in 2009. Although the 
market partially recovered in the following year, Ecuador’s government 
could not have predicted that and, thus, requested Chinese funding at 
the time. Third, at the end of 2008 (and four months before a Presiden-
tial election), Correa defaulted on a US$31 million interest payment on 
global bonds, stating that this is odious debt (Mapstone 2008; Santacruz 
2008). This was a de facto payment refusal to the United States and it 
led to Ecuador’s temporary exclusion from the global financial system 
which lasted until 2014. During that period, it was essential for Ecuador 
to seek non-U.S. funding sources.
After Correa’s 2008 debt default and his reelection, a series of hydro-
electric power plant failures led to a temporary energy crisis in Ecua-
dor. Blackouts in late 2009 and early 2010 pressured the government 
to purchase electricity from neighboring Colombia and Peru (Latin 
American Herald 2010) which motivated the Correa administration to 
subsequently develop more energy-related projects. Some were seen as 
viable, while others polarized public opinion. Perhaps the most widely 
discussed example is Coca Codo Sinclair, a dam project in an ecoregion 
of the Amazon jungle which was heavily criticized by Western media 
(Casey and Krauss 2018). Compiling these factors reveals that Correa’s 
pivot to Chinese development loans was motivated by his alienation of 
U.S. and international institutions and by Ecuador’s need to diversify its 
funding sources during a period of global market instability. In other 
words, a market downturn, paired with Correa’s political agenda of 
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pursuing financial independence from the United States and China’s 
international financial expansion, brought Chinese loans to Ecuador.
The discussion so far demonstrates that while China–Ecuador trade 
fluctuations can be explained by market factors, this is not true for 
investment patterns and is only partially true for loan trends. Trade com-
position, imbalances, and patterns match broader China–Latin America 
trends, and the initial rise of Chinese FDI in Ecuador was motivated by 
Correa’s rise to power in 2006, while a sharp 2011 spike and subsequent 
stabilization resulted from his consolidation of power. While the post-
2009 increase in Chinese loans to Ecuador is partially explained by the 
GFC, it was also driven by Correa’s foreign policy agenda of steering 
away from U.S.-led financial institutions. These developments enabled 
Correa’s administration to deliver on an agenda of increasing social 
spending while developing energy projects which matched well with 
China’s growing economic interest in Latin America.
China–Bolivia Economic Relations
Were China–Bolivia trade, investment, and loan patterns from 2005 to 
2014 driven by market, or political, forces? As we shall see, despite China’s 
relative dependency on Bolivian tin exports, overall trade patterns and 
composition are shaped by market forces, similar to the case of Ecuador. 
Regarding investment, although the amount of Chinese FDI in Bolivia is 
negligible, its fluctuation reveals some insight into the way Morales’ anti-
American ideology led to an increase in Chinese investment. Finally, I 
argue here that Chinese loans have risen in importance for Bolivia as an 
alternative to funding from U.S.-led institutions, most notably the World 
Bank; in this regard, their availability helped Morales to realize his politi-
cal vision of decreasing Bolivia’s dependence on the West.
Trade
Similar to the case of Ecuador, China’s trade patterns with Bolivia 
are largely market-driven. Bolivia’s global exports are almost entirely 
composed of raw materials, including natural gas (consistently over 
25%), various minerals, and precious metals such as zinc ore (fluctuat-
ing between 10% and 15%), tin, and lead (both fluctuating between 3% 
and 5%). In line with this trend, nearly 99 percent of all Bolivian exports 
to China are raw materials (Banco Central de Bolivia 2020b). China’s 
trade relations with Bolivia follow the broader China–Latin America pat-
tern, albeit with a little more fluctuation than in the case of Ecuador (cf. 
Figure 6 with Figure 1). As for most Latin American countries, this led 
Ivo Ganchev
WINTER 2020  371
to an increasing trade imbalance; by 2014, Bolivian imports from China 
(US$1.8 billion) had grown over four times the amount of exports 
(US$434 million; Banco Central de Bolivia 2020a).
Due to the small size of Bolivia’s economy, its trade volume is relatively 
insignificant for China. However, a more detailed analysis still provides 
some valuable insights. First, China turned from a relatively obscure to 
a significant trade partner for Bolivia. Second, a closer look at the data 
reveals that Bolivia’s main exports to China are topped not by natural 
gas but by zinc and silver (over 60% combined). They are followed by tin 
which plays a significant part in China–Bolivia trade relations. Although 
tin takes up a relatively small portion of Bolivian exports (fluctuating 
around 15% during the 2009–2014 period), it represents almost half of 
China’s total global tin purchases. This means that while trade relations 
are market-driven overall and too insignificant for China in terms of 
volume, they contain a strategic aspect of providing China with relatively 
rare raw materials necessary for its industrial development.
Investment
China’s investment in Bolivia is insignificant in terms of volume; yet 
its increase after Morales came to power reveals his administration’s 
deepening openness toward China. Bolivia has historically remained 
among the poorest countries in Latin America and consistently receives 
less investment than its neighboring countries. Chinese investment only 
takes up a small amount of this: using the World Bank’s (2020) FDI 
definition, it is consistently less than 1 percent of the total in Bolivia (La 
Marca 2017) and has no substantial impact on the country’s political or 
economic development.
Figure 6.
China–Bolivia Trade (Yearly / US$ Million).
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Chinese Exports to Bolivia (FOB) Bolivian Exports to China
Trade Imbalance Total
Source. Data from Agramont and Bonifaz (2018); graph created by author.
Note. FOB =  free on board.
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Still, Bolivia became marginally more open to Chinese investment 
after Morales came into power (Figures 7 and 8). During his first 
three years as president (2005–2007), Morales started a nationaliza-
tion campaign which targeted primarily the gas industry and other 
sectors managed by foreign enterprises. His goal was to renegotiate 
contracts which were deemed unfair, primarily with Western compa-
nies (Smith 2018), but the side effect of this approach was that West-
ern investors interpreted it as a sign of market uncertainty, opening 
an opportunity for those who are less sensitive to anti-liberalization 
reforms, including Chinese investors. The subsequent decrease in 
Chinese FDI in Bolivia is not directly related to any observable market 
or political trend. For instance, in 2008 global market prices of raw 
materials fell sharply—by 52 percent for zinc, 26 percent for tin, and 
32 percent for silver (Cicowiez and Machicado 2010)—and Bolivia 
needed additional funding. Meanwhile, the Chinese government 
encouraged its investors to increase OFDI, and in theory it should 
have inspired greater interest in Bolivia among other countries, but 
this did not happen—paradoxically, a small surge came later, in 2009 
when market prices of raw materials had recovered. In other words, 
post-2007 fluctuations do not reveal any substantial political insight. 
The only definitive conclusion here is that the Morales government 
was marginally more open to cooperating with Chinese investors than 
previous administrations.
Loans
In 2005, over one-third of Bolivia’s external debt was to the World 
Bank, but this soon changed. Morales consistently pursued policies 
of increasing Bolivia’s economic independence from Bretton Woods 
Figure 7.
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institutions and managed to push down debt levels to the World Bank 
from over 34 percent to nearly 10 percent during his first term, and fur-
ther down to 8.7 percent by 2014. Prior to 2005, Bolivia had relied on 
Bretton Woods institutions for decades, but recently, Morales proudly 
stated his country’s “total independence of them” (Telesur 2017). Under 
his leadership, Bolivia shifted to Latin American and Chinese loan pro-
viders. In 2005, around half of the government’s external debt was to the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB; 32.8%) and to the Andean 
Financing Corporation (17.6%). Bolivia subsequently maintained its 
relationship with the former and developed a greater dependency on 
the latter which held 30.9 percent of Bolivia’s debt in 2014. In the 
process, debt levels to the IADB surged to surpass 2005 figures (Banco 
Central de Bolivia 2020c). This reliance on Latin American institutions 
substituted engagement with the World Bank.
Meanwhile, Bolivia grew increasingly indebted to China. Before and 
during Morales’ first term, Chinese lending was virtually nonexistent, 
but it gradually rose to reach 9 percent of the country’s total external 
debt by 2014. In relative terms, this means that from 2005 to 2014 the 
importance of Chinese loans to Bolivia surpassed that of World Bank 
loans. Similar to Ecuador, this took place in the backdrop of an increas-
ingly strained relationship with the United States which was embodied in 
three trends. First, Morales was in constant disagreement with the United 
States regarding coca leaf production—a key source of income for Boliv-
ian farmers and a major source of drug supply to the United States. 
Second, an assassination attempt of Morales inspired him to claim that 
it was orchestrated by the CIA (Carroll 2009), while leaked information 
suggests that the United States secretly indicted some of its top officials 
for having connections with Morales after accusing them of involvement 
in a cocaine trafficking scheme (Grim and Wing 2015). Third, the stren-
uous U.S.–Bolivia relationship impacted Bolivia’s diplomatic relations 
Figure 8.
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with the West. One notable case is the refusal of France and Portugal to 
grant Morales a stopover permit as he was flying from Russia to Bolivia. 
They forced Morales to land in Austria due to suspicions that fugitive 
Edward Snowden might be on his plane—and the same reasoning was 
used by the United States in various diplomatic skirmishes with Ecuador 
(Roberts 2013). Overall, the decrease in Bolivia’s financial dependence 
on Western institutions has been paired with continuous strain on its 
relations with the United States. From this perspective, it becomes clear 
that while Bolivia’s most important financial ties are with Latin Ameri-
can institutions, Chinese banks successfully established themselves as key 
alternative lenders, counterbalancing Western institutions.
China’s loans thus had greater political impact than its trade with 
and investment in Bolivia. Although Bolivia’s tin supply carries a stra-
tegic element to bilateral trade, it remains market-driven—much like 
Ecuador’s trade with China. In terms of investment, China–Bolivia 
cooperation increased slightly after Morales came to power, but volume 
has been too small and fluctuations too sporadic to be meaningful. By 
contrast, China’s provision of loans to Bolivia increased notably under 
Morales; although his government did not take Chinese loans during 
its first term, it began to do so during his second term and continued 
thereafter—by 2014, Chinese banks combined had overtaken the World 
Bank in terms of loans provided to Bolivia. This trend was motivated by 
increasing strain on U.S.–Bolivia diplomatic relations and by the Boliv-
ian government’s determination to decrease its dependency on Western 
institutions, most notably the World Bank. This reveals that the observed 
economic relationship has political implications as the availability of 
Chinese loans indirectly allowed Bolivia to steer away from Western 
financial influence and to pursue leftist politics.
Intertwining Economic Interests and Ideology
We have seen that China’s trade patterns with Ecuador and Bolivia 
for the 2005–2014 period are explained by market trends, but this does 
not hold true for investment patterns in Ecuador, for loan patterns to 
Bolivia, and to some extent for Chinese loan patterns to Ecuador. These 
three intensified during periods of rise and/or consolidation of Correa 
and Morales’ grip on power, both of which are characterized by shifts 
away from U.S. influence and from international financial institutions. 
Before engaging in the discussion, it is worth noting that some Chinese 
funding to Ecuador and Bolivia has impacted local communities nega-
tively. This includes environmental damage and undermining the local 
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labor market by employing Chinese workers to complete construction 
projects—for Ecuador, such reports have been surfacing at least since 
2013 in academia (Gallagher et  al. 2017; González-Vicente 2013) and 
media (Hill 2014; Nathanson 2017); more minor criticisms of environ-
mental damage have emerged about Bolivia (Praeli 2018). In many 
outlets, these issues receive more attention than the political aspects 
of China–Latin America relations and are often framed as criticisms of 
China; yet their roots can also partially be traced to a lack of provision or 
of capability to enforce local regulations. This topic forms an important 
part of understanding China’s impact on Latin America but falls outside 
of this article’s scope.
I now turn to argue that a combination of four factors led to the 
development of a cyclic reinforcement of China’s interests and leftist 
Pink Tide agendas: (1) the mutually beneficial aspect of strategic eco-
nomic deals matching Chinese funding with Latin American natural 
resource extraction projects; (2) the role of geopolitical competition 
which encourages states to hedge between the United States and China; 
(3) China’s diplomacy of solidarity with developing countries, which 
helps foster relations with Latin America; and (4) the rise of anti-Amer-
icanism seen as a pillar of national identity formation in Ecuador and 
Bolivia, which indirectly incites their interest in China.
Overlapping Economic Strategies
China, Ecuador, and Bolivia all share three economic goals: seeking 
mutual complementarity, diversifying funding sources (Ecuador and 
Bolivia) and raw material suppliers (China), and securing long-term 
deals to develop large-scale projects. China’s economic engagement 
with Ecuador and Bolivia largely falls within two sectors, energy and raw 
materials. The former is key to powering China’s rapid economic growth, 
while the latter supports its industry; energy plays a larger strategic role 
and it is thus explored first and in greater detail. In terms of oil and 
gas, China transitioned from a self-sufficient state to a major importer 
within the past 40 years. From 1978 until 1992, it maintained a policy 
of yin jinlai (lit. “attract to enter”) aimed at sourcing foreign invest-
ment to accumulate capital; during that period, its energy production 
remained self-sufficient, relying heavily on coal. After China became a 
net oil importer in the 1990s, it grew increasingly concerned with energy 
security, rather than energy policy. Political instability in major exporter-
states and concerns about sea transport security (e.g., the Malacca Strait) 
turned into oft-discussed policy issues that permeated academic debates 
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(see, for example, Ji 2007; Zhang 2011). After Jiang Zemin adopted the 
zou chuqu (lit. “going out”) policy, state-owned Chinese enterprises were 
encouraged to expand overseas. In the past decade, the threat of poten-
tial power outages rose in importance within China as social forces grew 
stronger (Luo and Yao 2012; Watts 2010).
Opposing voices stand at the two extremes of China’s energy security 
debate. On one end, conservatives from various coal research institutes 
advocate self-reliance; they pursue intensive research on clean coal 
energy and coal liquefaction (Nolan, Rui, and Shipman 2004; Rong and 
Victor 2011; Xinhua 2018). On the other end, scholars of international 
political economy such as Zha (2016) advocate market reliance. As of 
2020, China has not succeeded in developing a low-cost technology 
ensuring self-reliance, and the market occasionally experiences volatili-
ties; in response to these risks, it pursues a strategy of improving general 
relations (to potentially secure future contracts) and signing long-term 
deals with oil and gas exporters—China’s rapprochement with Ecuador 
and Bolivia is thus part of a broader energy security strategy. Similarly, 
manufacturing also requires increasingly large quantities of imported 
raw materials, and thus, China is interested in developing comprehen-
sive strategic partnerships, rather than seeking short-term profit from 
deals with natural resource exporters.
Ecuador and Bolivia’s leftist governments also had a strategic motiva-
tion to engage with China from 2005–2006 to 2014. In Ecuador, Correa 
sought a number of loan-for-oil deals with China, allowing him imme-
diate access to funding at the cost of future production while staying 
at odds with U.S.-led international financial institutions. Some media 
outlets criticized such deals for the potential budget deficit they may 
cause; however, the deals could be more accurately understood as a gam-
bler’s bet on a bullish oil market. China–Ecuador loan-for-oil repayment 
agreements are linked to the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) index, 
which means the value of oil repayments is based on market prices. The 
primary difference with market-based trade is that Ecuador receives 
payments in advance and commits to one specific “buyer,” China. This 
approach was adopted to secure funding for new extraction projects in 
hopes that oil price will continue to rise. The funding was also used to 
develop infrastructure while steering away from U.S. economic influ-
ence; Correa defined this aim at the beginning of his first campaign 
and often expressed it through anti-American discourse. While Chinese 
funding to Ecuador is only a small part of the latter’s complex political 
landscape, it helped Correa to pursue his spending-heavy agenda and 
sustain popular support for three consecutive terms.
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Bolivia’s economic reliance on the United States and the extent of 
its engagement with China lag behind those of Ecuador; thus, trends 
are not as pronounced in this case. Still, China’s role in the Morales 
government strategy is similar to that in Correa’s Ecuador. Chinese 
loans allowed Bolivia to afford steering away from World Bank loans to 
develop local infrastructure and smaller projects while gaining greater 
independence from Western actors. Overall, China’s strategic economic 
aims of further diversifying its energy and raw material suppliers coin-
cided with the resource-rich states of Ecuador and Bolivia’s quests for 
non-Western funding sources.
U.S.–China Geopolitical Competition
After the Cold War, international politics was defined by U.S. domi-
nance until China’s rise challenged this established order. An increas-
ing number of critics have argued that China aims to project its power 
globally (Chhabra and Hass 2019) and eventually overtake the United 
States (Pillsbury 2016) as the leading world power. While some believe 
this is exaggerated, there is broad consensus that China has become 
increasingly assertive. This has been institutionalized in three ways; first, 
China regularly organizes regional summits with Latin America, Africa, 
and Central and Eastern Europe. Second, it has successfully backed new 
financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
and the New Development Bank. Third, China leads the impressively 
ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.
Opinions over the implications of China’s rise for the international 
order are divided. Optimists predict a peaceful transition toward a bipo-
lar or multipolar world (Han 2009), and this is echoed by Chinese media 
(Okuda 2016). Pessimists point to rising tensions between the United 
States and China as evidenced in the case of Taiwan, the trade war (Paal 
2018), and the recent “battle of narratives” over COVID-19. Realist schol-
ars express deep concern as their theories predict that friction between 
rising and established powers produces violent conflicts (Alison 2017). 
Examining China’s rise through frameworks such as Gilpin’s (1981) hege-
monic stability, Modelski’s (1987) long cycle theory, and Mearsheimer’s 
(2001) offensive realism makes for pessimistic speculations that a war 
between a rising challenger and an established hegemon is difficult to 
avoid. They predict that the eventual winner of this clash will restructure 
the new international order in its favor.
While signs of an upcoming violent conflict between China and the 
United States still remain rather scarce, the rapprochement between 
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China and Latin America can be seen as a mode of undermining 
U.S. influence. As Mearsheimer points out, offensive realism posits 
that no single state can dominate the globe, and thus, the optimal 
strategy for a rising power is to dominate its own region while ensur-
ing that no other state dominates their region. His theory elegantly 
illustrates U.S. foreign policy: for decades, the United States viewed 
Latin America as its “backyard” (Livingstone 2009) while pursuing a 
containment policy toward China. U.S. containment in Asia resembles 
its Cold War policy toward the USSR, while Chinese influence in Latin 
America resembles that of the USSR in the region. These parallels are 
partial, but they reveal a deeper insight, namely that the United States 
and China are competing for strategic influence within each other’s 
adjacent regions. From the standpoint of Latin American states, simul-
taneously increasing their economic engagement with the United 
States and China is a balancing act. For relatively small states, overreli-
ance on one great power alone is risky, especially as the United States 
and China draw accusations of pursuing neocolonial policies toward 
Latin America. Ecuador and Bolivia have opted not to bandwagon 
with either one great power but seem to have been hedging between 
the two. This explains Correa and Morales’ foreign policy strategies: 
while maintaining economic partnerships with the United States, they 
simultaneously deepened ties with China.
In light of this, China’s rapprochement with Ecuador and Bolivia 
epitomizes a geopolitical clash between a rising and an established 
power in three ways. First, China has become increasingly assertive. 
Second, Chinese attempts to undermine U.S. influence in Latin Amer-
ica are a response to a quasi-containment U.S. policy toward China. 
Third, if Ecuador and Bolivia hedge successfully between China and 
the United States, they can benefit from geopolitical competition 
between the two. This analysis presents a cyclic mechanism for the 
mutual reinforcement of all three trends. The United States must 
defend its hegemonic status through pursuing a bid for dominance 
in Latin America, while China’s only path to global leadership is to 
undermine that; the more assertive each great power becomes, the 
stronger the response from its counterpart, triggering a vicious cycle of 
escalating competition for influence in Latin America. This offers an 
opportunity for states such as Ecuador and Bolivia to gain greater ben-
efits such as negotiation leverage by balancing between the two great 
powers. Meanwhile, this further forces policy makers in the United 
States and China to pursue a strategy of increasingly aggressive compe-
tition for influence, akin to an arms race.
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China’s Diplomacy of Solidarity
Theory shapes International Relations research, but history domi-
nates diplomatic discussions. Historically, China has remained keen to 
engage with the leftist governments of developing states; in the Cold War 
era, it expressed “solidarity” with the “third world.” During the 1950s 
and 1960s, China was a vocal revisionist state that took an active part 
in initiatives such as the Bandung Conference; after 1978, China aban-
doned its revisionist views to seek greater economic gains and higher 
status in the international system. Since then, China has used its rhetoric 
of solidarity in much subtler ways during bilateral diplomatic meetings 
and visits. Still, it seeks to present itself as a compassionate, equal partner 
to developing countries based on their shared anti-colonial struggles 
and on a long-standing shared commitment to “non-interference” in the 
domestic politics of other states. This creates a historical contrast with 
the West’s dominance over former colonies, the promotion of Western 
neoliberalism and international financial institutions through political 
conditionalities, and U.S. policy toward Latin America. Overall, China 
aims to present itself as a historically credible alternative to the West.
Besides, the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese 
Communist Party was established in 1951 to specialize in communicating 
with leftist parties abroad (Gitter and Fang 2016). During the 1980s, the 
ILD’s focus expanded toward cultivating relations with non-communist 
parties, and its influence subsequently diminished. However, the ILD’s 
apparatus influenced decades of diplomacy, and thus it still remains 
mildly easier for Chinese officials to establish working relationships with 
leftist governments. Such a marginal and unofficial preference cannot 
be seen as a major driving factor for China’s rapprochement with Ecua-
dor and Bolivia. Yet, combined with a rhetoric of solidarity, it provided 
a favorable precondition for establishing engagement with these coun-
tries’ leftist governments between 2005 and 2014 based on shared values 
and ideas.
Latin American Identities and Anti-Americanism
The failures of neoliberalism in Latin America posed many new ques-
tions about development and polarized some societies in the region. 
From the perspective of political economy, it would be necessary to 
examine states according to their levels of development; however, this 
would obscure the historical complexities which shape Latin America. 
During the colonial period, varied ethnic groups were politically domi-
nated across the region; this was followed by decades of U.S. political 
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influence in the postindependence era. A postcolonial reading of these 
trends reveals that Latin American states are struggling to form defined 
identities (Young 2011). The rise of leftist movements in the region was 
largely prompted by some countries’ quest for identification of a “self” 
which is only possible in opposition to an “other” (Katzenstein 1996).
Critical scholars have explored Bolivia and Ecuador’s struggles for 
identity formation. For instance, Rimassa (2008) analyzes symbolism in 
Morales’ Movimiento al Socialismo to argue that the construction of a com-
mon enemy is key to achieving unity between rural and urban workers 
in Bolivia. For this purpose, the enemy can only be external—thus, it is 
unsurprising that Morales “rejects all forms of imperialist penetration or 
subjugation that seek to exert domination over the will of the Bolivian 
people, the national State or the wealth and destiny of the Republic” 
(Movimiento al Socialismo 2004, 20).
From a political psychology perspective, defining a common enemy 
is more productive for national cohesion than defining a common goal. 
It invokes an urgent need for unity in the face of danger, and it implicitly 
downgrades ethnic/civil conflict within the state. Thus, while Morales’ 
anti-imperialist rhetoric causes frictions in international politics, it aims 
to achieve the opposite effect within Bolivia. The case of Correa’s anti-
Americanism is similar as his agenda is explicitly framed around resis-
tance to the United States (Romero 2006). Partly due to their constant 
calls for a rise against a common “enemy,” both Correa and Morales are 
seen as populist leaders who were permanently campaigning (Conaghan 
and de la Torre 2008). Seeking the sustained promotion of an alleged 
“anti-imperialist” ideology, they became prisoners of their own agendas 
with no other option but to pursue a populist narrative branded as “anti-
imperialism” which resulted in policies undermining relations with the 
United States. After damaging the economic aspect of these relations, 
Ecuador and Bolivia sought to fill in financial gaps through alternative 
channels.
China’s willingness to invest in and lend to Latin America contributed 
to the ability of self-styled “anti-imperialist” leaders Correa and Morales 
to rebalance their economies while steering away from the United States, 
at least in the short run. From China’s perspective, the resulting cyclic 
relationship between its investment and loans in Ecuador and Bolivia, 
and the temporary consolidation of leftist governments there might not 
necessarily be the result of deliberate strategizing. Chinese banks are in 
many cases legitimately targeting profits or acting in line with Beijing’s 
energy security policy by seeking diversification of natural resource 
suppliers. Nevertheless, their commitment to engagement with Latin 
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America has indirectly aided leftist leaders there, providing them with 
the financial means to maintain anti-American policy stances while ful-
filling their domestic agendas and pursuing multiple bids for reelection. 
The sustenance of the left in Ecuador and Bolivia during 2005–2014 
was supported by China’s economic interests in Latin America and vice 
versa: aside from market-driven increases in trade, non-leftist govern-
ments would have been unlikely to engage with China. Thus, Correa and 
Morales’ success seems partially based on a quest for (re)defining Ecua-
dor and Bolivia’s national identities in opposition to the United States as 
an “other”—and this was supported through deepening investment and 
loan relations with China where ruptures with the United States had left 
financial gaps.
In sum, the deepening of Chinese economic relations with Ecua-
dor and Bolivia is intertwined with the rise and success of Correa and 
Morales from 2005 to 2014. Areas of mutual complementarity between 
China and its Latin American counterparts demonstrate that its need 
for diversifying energy and raw material suppliers matched well with 
Pink Tide agendas of heavy social spending and extractive develop-
ment. The geopolitical competition between the United States and 
China also led to a scramble for Latin America that encouraged Ecua-
dor and Bolivia to hedge between the two to maximize their gains. 
And China’s rhetoric of “solidarity” with developing countries and 
its experience in dealing with leftist governments provided favorable 
preconditions for the development of strong relationships with the 
Morales and Correa administrations.
Pursuing closer economic relations with China to steer away from the 
United States has a deep psychological meaning for identity formation 
in Ecuador and Bolivia, allowing both to shape a stronger perception of 
“self” in opposition to the United States as an alleged “imperialist other.” 
These four factors were mutually reinforcing; they led to the forma-
tion of a cyclic relationship between the rise and success of leftist, anti-
American leaders and the increased availability of Chinese funding as an 
alternative to U.S. and/or U.S.-led international financial institutions.
Conclusion
This article analyzed trends in China’s economic relations with Ecua-
dor and Bolivia and explored the macro-economic and political factors 
that explain these trends and the mechanisms which motivated China’s 
economic engagement with Ecuador and Bolivia from 2005 to 2014. Eco-
nomic relations were defined in terms of trade, investment, and loans; in 
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both Ecuador and Bolivia, the former is market-driven. However, this is 
not the case for investment in Ecuador, for loans to Bolivia, and to some 
extent for Chinese loans to Ecuador. I contend that these three forms 
of funding are motivated by a cyclic, mutual reinforcement of China’s 
economic interests and by the rise of leftist leaders Correa and Morales 
who were integral to the Pink Tide. As Chinese economic engagement 
with Ecuador and Bolivia increased, it provided an economic alternative 
to funding from U.S.-led international institutions. More importantly, 
these dynamics were underpinned by four factors: (1) mutual comple-
mentarity between China’s demand for energy and natural resource 
supply diversification alongside spending-heavy, extractive development 
agendas shaped by the Pink Tide; (2) U.S.–China geopolitical compe-
tition for influence in Latin America; (3) China’s past experience in 
engaging with leftist governments from developing countries; and (4) 
anti-American ideology aiming to shape national identity through leftist 
narratives in Ecuador and Bolivia.
In 2014, it would have been reasonable to assume that the cyclic 
reinforcement between the rise of the Pink Tide and increasing Chinese 
economic engagement with Latin America will accelerate further over 
time. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that this was 
not the case. In 2017, Correa was succeeded by his former Vice President 
Lenin Moreno who pursues more moderate policies and maintains a 
productive dialogue with the United States. In 2019, Morales attempted 
to run for a fourth term illegally, which led to social unrest and inspired 
his eventual fall from power. As of 2020, both Correa and Morales live in 
asylum (in Belgium and Argentina, respectively), which alienates them 
from domestic politics. The Pink Tide was followed by a conservative 
one, leading to the elections of Mauricio Macri (Argentina), Sebastián 
Piñera (Chile), and Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil). This turnaround of events 
is not unexpected in itself; despite the occasional rise of dictators in 
Latin America, politics in the region is historically dynamic, and Chinese 
economic engagement alone can hardly halt local trends and discon-
tents; besides, economic engagement and geographical proximity to the 
United States still outweigh Chinese economic influence on domestic 
politics in Latin America over the long term. Nevertheless, this did not 
preclude China from accentuating the Pink Tide by indirectly support-
ing the rise and success of Correa and Moreno and prolonging the life 
span of their administrations.
While the Pink Tide has ended, Chinese investment and loans in 
Ecuador and Bolivia continue. For 2015–2018, yearly Chinese FDI in 
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Ecuador averaged at US$81.8 million, which was comparable to the 
historically highest (US$85.5 million yearly average) four-year period, 
2011–2014 (Banco Central del Ecuador 2020c). As of 2019, Bolivian 
debt to China remains at 8.7 percent and fluctuated at around 9 percent 
for 2014–2018 (Banco Central de Bolivia 2020c). This means that what 
started as a cyclic relationship ultimately resulted in the fall of the Pink 
Tide and the sustenance of Chinese economic engagement with Ecua-
dor and Bolivia. Although these interactions began as mutually benefi-
cial, from a realist perspective the real “winner” appears to be China as it 
obtained relative gains through achieving the strategic aim of sustaining 
its influence in Latin America over the long term.
The impact of China’s economic rise on Latin American politics 
reveals complex dynamics. It is thus necessary for further research 
to probe into the strategic motivations behind China–Latin America 
interactions. To what extent are the approaches of Latin American 
governments to China motivated by national interest as opposed to 
partisan politics? Is it possible for Latin American states to obtain 
relative gains through deepening engagement with China? And does 
China have a coordinated strategy for indirect interference in the 
domestic politics of Latin American states through economic means? 
Chinese officials maintain a foreign policy stance of “non-interfer-
ence,” and on the surface, they indeed avoid directly meddling in 
the domestic political affairs of other sovereign states. However, as 
this article has demonstrated, China’s rise and increasing economic 
engagement with the world can still have profound systemic effects 
on both national and international politics. The complex mechanisms 
which bring about these effects and the difficulty in observing their 
implications for the world make them elusive. Yet they remain impact-
ful and ought to be explored more carefully and more frequently 
within and beyond Latin America.
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